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Introduction
Hurwicz (1994) in contrast to large parts of the literature stresses the fundamental difference between games and mechanisms (game forms).
The concept of a game form, that allows it to formally separate the rules of a game from players' individual evaluations of the outcomes, is a cardinal tool for applications of 1 game theory. The possibility to choose the outcome space of a mechanism (or game form) according to the specific needs of the problem to be modelled makes implementation theory a powerful instrument. A key role in that theory is played by the property called Maskin monotonicity, that is a necessary property for a social choice rule to be implementable in Nash equilibrium (see Maskin (1999) ).
While many specific applications almost naturally distinguish "the" suitable mechanism, thus outcome function, this is not the case when cooperative solutions are to be Nash implemented. The aim to relate cooperative solutions of coalitional games to Nash equilibria of non-cooperative games in strategic or extensive form goes back to Nash (1951 Nash ( , 1953 and is now commonly referred to as the "Nash program". The exact relation between the Nash program and implementation theory has been addressed explicitly in the literature only in the last decade. Serrano (1997) states: "The Nash program and the abstract theory of implementation are often regarded as unrelated research agendas", and Bergin and Duggan (1999) write: "... because the implementation-theoretic and traditional approaches both involve the construction of games and game forms whose equilibria have specific features, considerable confusion surrounds the relationship between them." Several articles have recently tried to dispose of this confusion: Dagan and Serrano (1998), Serrano (1997 Serrano ( , 2005a , Bergin and Duggan (1999) , Trockel (2002a Trockel ( , 2003 . At the heart of the problem lies the fact that a cooperative solution as a technical concept is distinct from a social choice rule. Consequently, Nash implementation of a cooperative solution is literally impossible, as it is not well defined. A crucial step in making solutions implementable is therefore the interpretation of a solution as a social choice rule. Formally, this means the suitable definition of a solution based social choice rule that carries the characteristic features of the underlying solution.
While social choice rules are mappings associating certain outcomes to profiles of preferences or utility functions, solutions associate feasible (monetary or utility) payoffs of players to certain coalitional games. A basic task is it therefore to understand the relation between utility profiles and coalitional games. In their seminal paper, Bergin and Duggan (1999) explain this problem by use of the notions of "effectivity" and "supportability".
Supportability associates with a coalitional game an underlying profile of utility functions supporting it. Effectivity associates with any utility profile a coalitional form to describe the potential strategic effects on coalitional worths. While here and likewise in Trockel (2002a Trockel ( , 2003 the relation between social choice rules and solutions is formally analyzed, it is ignored in large parts of the literature, a fact that contributes to the "confusion" mentioned above.
Nash in his non-cooperative foundation of the Nash bargaining solution left the supportability problem unsettled. Implementation in the sense of mechanism theory was not yet an issue for him. Howard (1992) and Moulin (1984) provided early implementations in subgame perfect equilibria of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, respectively. They both ignored, or better avoided, the effectivity problem by introducing solutions directly as social choice functions defined on a space of utility profiles.
In order to implement bargaining solutions like those of Nash or Kalai-Smorodinsky one has to generate an outcome space and to define solution based social choice rules. This corresponds to solve in that context the supportability-effectivity problem.
There are obviously several possibilities to factorize a payoff vector function into an outcome function and a vector of utility functions. The two extreme cases are to take a) the outcome space as identical to the strategy space, choosing the outcome function as the identity map and the utility functions as the payoff functions; b) the outcome space to be the space of payoff vectors, choosing the utility functions as projections to payoffs and the outcome function as the payoff vector function.
For different choices of outcome space and preferences on the outcome space one clearly gets different solution based social choice rules. And Maskin monotonicity may very well depend on the actually selected solution based social choice rule. Howard (1992) argues that, due to a lack of Maskin monotonicity, the Nash bargaining solution fails to be Nash implementable. That a suitably defined Nash bargaining social choice rule is in fact Nash implementable has been demonstrated by von Damme (1986), Naeve (1999) , and Trockel (2000 Trockel ( , 2002b .
In the next section we shall revisit the example by Howard and show that by choosing a different outcome function we can define a Nash social choice rule that is Maskin monotonic. We shall extend this discrete context to its convexification where our reasoning remains true. In section 3 we provide an alternative approach to Howard's example that allows it to avoid the violation of Maskin monotonicity. Section 4 briefly sketches that the situation with some other Pareto efficient solutions is similar. We particularly focus on the KalaiSmorodinsky solution. Again, the examples are discrete and chosen in such a way that bargaining solutions are well defined and unique but allow for straightforward extensions to the convexified bargaining sets. The key property for this conclusion is some symmetry property of the considered bargaining solutions. The concluding section 5 considers essential monotonicity that for more than two players is sufficient for Nash implementability. For any Pareto efficient bargaining solution we establish essential monotonicity, hence Maskin monotonicity, of the induced solution based social choice rule in our setup.
Howard's Example
We consider a bargaining problem, in which two agents negotiate over the alternatives Q, S, V . If they do not come to an agreement the outcome is the status quo alternative Q.
The set of admissible utility profiles on A := {Q, S, V } is U := {u, u } ≡ {(u 1 , u 2 ), (u 1 , u 2 )} where u i , u i , i = 1, 2 are real valued (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility functions that are defined on A as follows:
A bargaining solution in this framework is a mappingλ :
The Nash solution is the bargaining solutionν that solves maxλλ 1 (u(A))λ 2 (u(A)) and maxλλ 1 (u (A))λ 2 (u (A)).
The Nash social choice rule in this model is given by the correspondenceφν : U =⇒ A withφν(w) := argmax a∈A w 1 (a) w 2 (a).
As depicted in Figure 1 , for the profile u, we obtainφν(u) = {S} because u 1 (S) u 2 (S) = s 1 s 2 maximizes the Nash product u 1 (a) u 2 (a) on A. For the profile u we getφν(u ) = {V }.
Hence, the switch from profile u to profile u results in a different social optimum in A. In particular, outcome S drops out of the Nash correspondence. However, we see no preference reversal involving S that is induced by that switch: S remains the best outcome for player 1 and the second ranked outcome for player 2. Therefore, Maskin monotonicity is violated.
The arguments do not change when we replace A by the mixture set generated by A. For instance, let Q, S, V be defined as (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 1), respectively, and let ∆A := convex hull(A). As any point in ∆A is a convex combination of (i.e., a probability distribution over) Q, S, V , its utility is simply the expected value of u i or u i (i = 1, 2),
Figure 1: Howard's example for the Nash solution respectively. Now, u and u -for convenience we denote their extensions to ∆A again by u, u -map ∆A onto different compact convex sets.
Next, we present an alternative to Howard's model in which Maskin monotonicity is satisfied. Obviously, ν is the Nash solution on B as it maximizes the Nash product on B and B .
Alternative model for Howard's Example
Observe that B and B are exactly the two bargaining problems considered in the previous section. Now, define the outcome spaceÃ to be the set of all bargaining solutions on B, i.e.,
OnÃ we define profiles of utility functionsũ,ũ by setting for any α ∈Ã,
andũ (α) = α(B ).
LetŨ := {ũ,ũ }. The bijection betweenŨ and B associatingũ with B andũ with B provides the effectivity/supportability of Bergin and Duggan (1999) in our specific context! Next, we define our Nash social choice rule ϕ ν :Ũ =⇒Ã by
Note that in particular λ ∈ ϕ ν (ũ ). Thus, when switching fromũ toũ the former social optimum λ is no longer one at preferencesũ (see Figure 2) . But, now a preference reversal involving social optima is involved. Indeed, while atũ we haveũ(λ) =ũ(ν) = (1, 1), we get u 1 (ν) = 3/4 < 1 =ũ 1 (λ) andũ 2 (ν) = 2 > 1 =ũ 2 (λ) at profileũ . Thus, ν is strictly better than λ for player 2. Hence, Maskin monotonicity is not violated. 
Further examples
Howard's observation that the specific Nash social choice rule is not Maskin monotonic is not limited to the Nash bargaining solution. Figure 3 illustrates an example with five physical outcomes A = {Q, S, V, W 1 , W 2 } and two profiles of utility functions u, u given by . Immediate calculations revealφκ(u) = {S} andφκ(u ) = {V }. Again, physical outcome S is no longer desirable, when moving from u to u , but the ranking of outcomes in A are identical in u and u . So,φκ is not Maskin monotonic. As in Section 2, nothing is altered, when considering ∆A and extensions of u and u .
By a closer inspection of Figure 3 , it is straightforward that the lack of Maskin monotonicity can be replicated for any Pareto efficient and symmetric bargaining solution. 
Monotonicity
Trockel (2002a) shows that any solution based social choice rule stemming from a Pareto efficient bargaining solution does satisfy Maskin monotonicity -a necessary condition for Nash implementability. As we demonstrate in this section a solution based social choice correspondence in fact satisfies a stronger version of monotonicity: essential monotonicity. Yamato (1992, Theorem 2) shows that this version is sufficient for Nash implementation, 1 Roughly, one has to define u, u such that u (A) is obtained from u(A) by exchanging coordinates, but without reversing preferences over A. With an appropriate choice of utilities of S and V the solution switches between these physical outcomes.
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when there are at least three players.
2
We consider a population I := {1, . . . , n} of n players. An n-person bargaining game B consists of a closed and convex subset of R n -the utility possibility set -and an interior point -the status quo point -such that the set of status quo dominating points is bounded. Let B be a nonempty set of (admitted) bargaining games for n persons.
We define the outcome spaceÃ to be the set of all bargaining solutions on B, i.e.,Ã := {α : B −→ R n | α(B) ∈ B, B ∈ B}. ByŨ we denote the set of all (admitted) profiles of utility functions onÃ such that there is a well defined one-to-one correspondence betweeñ U and B along the effectivity/supportability results in Bergin and Duggan (1999) . To be precise,ũ = (ũ 1 , . . . ,ũ n ) ∈Ũ if and only if there is B ∈ B such that for all α ∈Ã we havẽ u(α) = α(B), meaning that player i evaluates bargaining solutions by the utility they assign to him in bargaining problem B. Therefore, we henceforth identify utility functions profilẽ u with bargaining problem B orũ with B .
Let η ∈Ã be a prespecified bargaining solution. Define a (solution based) social choice correspondence
That means, ϕ η assigns toũ ∈Ũ all bargaining solutions inÃ that coincide with η onũ (i.e., on B). Put differently, when defining ϕ η (ũ), the corresponding bargaining problem B is the only relevant one. Therefore, if η is supposed to be a desirable bargaining solution, then all solutions that coincide with η on B should be equally desirable and are therefore collected in ϕ η (ũ) as well.
For i = I,ũ ∈Ũ and α ∈Ã define i's lower contour set of α atũ by
LetM be a subset ofÃ and F :Ũ =⇒Ã. An outcome α ∈M is F -essential for i ∈ I inM , if there existsū ∈Ũ with α ∈ F (ū) and L i (ū, α) ⊆M . Denote by Ess i (M , F ) the set of F -essential outcomes for i inM . F satisfies essential monotonicity, if for all i ∈ I, u,ũ ∈Ũ , and all α ∈ F (ũ),
Theorem (Yamato(1992), Theorem 2) Suppose n ≥ 3. If F satisfies essential monotonicity, then F is Nash implementable.
Proposition Let η ∈Ã be a Pareto efficient bargaining solution. Then ϕ η is essentially monotonic. Hence ϕ η is Nash implementable, if there are three or more players.
Proof. We start with two immediate observations.
1. For allũ ∈Ũ we have η ∈ ϕ η (ũ).
2. For allũ ∈Ũ , i ∈ I and β ∈ ϕ η (ũ), L i (ũ, β) = L i (ũ, η). Now, letũ,ũ ∈Ũ and α ∈ ϕ η (ũ) be such that Ess i (L i (ũ, α), ϕ η ) ⊆ L i (ũ , α) for all i ∈ I.
We need to show α ∈ ϕ η (ũ ).
First, for all i ∈ I, any β ∈ ϕ η (ũ) is ϕ η -essential in L i (ũ, α). To see this, takeũ as utility profileū in the definition of essential outcomes. Then, clearly, β ∈ ϕ η (ũ) and by the second observation L i (ũ, β) ⊆ L i (ũ, α). Hence, for all i ∈ I we have
With the first observation, η ∈ L i (ũ , α), and thereforeũ i (η) ≤ũ i (α) (i ∈ I), which is equivalent to η(B ) ≤ a(B ), where B is the bargaining problem identified withũ . Since η is Pareto efficient, η(B ) = a(B ), i.e.,ũ i (η) =ũ i (α) (i ∈ I), implying α ∈ ϕ η (ũ ).
It is easy to see that essential monotonicity implies Maskin monotonicity. We can therefore confirm the following result in Trockel (2002a) , as it is a direct corollary of the Proposition.
Corollary Any solution based social choice correspondence with underlying Pareto efficient bargaining solution is Maskin monotonic.
